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We de¯ne two families of rules to adjudicate con°icting claims.
The ¯rst family contains the constrained equal awards, constrained
equal losses, Talmud, and minimal overlap rules. The second fam-
ily, which also contains the constrained equal awards and constrained
equal losses rules, is obtained from the ¯rst one by exchanging, for each
problem, how well agents with relatively larger claims are treated as
compared to agents with relatively smaller claims. In each case, we
identify the subfamily of consistent rules.
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11 Introduction
When a ¯rm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be divided
among its creditors? More generally, when several agents have claims on
a resource adding up to more than is available, how should that amount
be divided? A \division rule" is a function that associates with each such
problem a recommendation for it, namely a division of the resource.1
We propose and study two simple and yet surprisingly rich families of
rules.2 When surveying the literature, one cannot help but notice resem-
blances between rules and our families provide formal connections between
several central ones. The ¯rst family contains the following four: the \con-
strained equal awards rule" and the \constrained equal losses rule", both
already familiar to Maimonides (12th Century); the \Talmud rule", intro-
duced by Aumann and Maschler (1985) to rationalize certain examples found
in the Talmud; and the \minimal overlap rule", proposed by O'Neill (1982)
as an extension of an incompletely speci¯ed rule appearing in Rabad (12th
Century) (Section 3). The second family is a counterpart in which relatively
small claims and relatively large claims are treated in a reverse way to the
way they are treated by the ¯rst family. It contains the constrained equal
awards and constrained equal losses rules. (These two rules are the only ones
the two families have in common.)
The main ingredient in the de¯nitions of the families is the basic idea of
equality, applied either to the amounts claimants receive or to the losses they
incur (the di®erences between their claims and their awards). For the ¯rst
family, keeping the claims vector ¯xed, let us describe how awards evolve as
the resource endowment increases from 0 to the sum of the claims. Initially,
all claimants share each increment equally; they are excluded in succession
and for a while, in the order of increasing claims; for each increment, all
claimants who are not excluded yet share it equally; this goes on until the
agent with the largest claim is the only one left, and for a while, he receives
the totality of each increment; then claimants come back in the order of
decreasing claims; here too, for each increment, all claimants who are present
share it equally. This goes on until all claimants have returned and until they
are fully compensated (Section 4).
For the second family of rules, the reverse occurs: initially, only the agent
1For a survey of the literature devoted to this subject, see Thomson (2003).
2These families are introduced by Thomson (2000).
1with the largest claim is present and claimants are introduced to partake in
the distribution in the order of decreasing claims; for each increment, all
claimants who are present share it equally; claimants leave in the order of
increasing claims, each claimant leaving when he is fully compensated. The
agent with the largest claim is the last one to leave (Section 5).
The richness of the families comes from the freedom in choosing where
claimants are dropped o® and where they are invited back in (or conversely,
for the second family), and in particular, from the fact that these drop-o®
and pick-up points are allowed to depend on the claims vector.
We identify the basic properties of the two families. We then turn to
\duality" notions. Two rules are \dual" if one divides the amount available
as the other divides the de¯cit (the di®erence between the sum of the claims
and the endowment). Both families are closed under duality. A rule is \self-
dual" if it is invariant under duality. The only self-dual member of the ¯rst
family is the Talmud rule and the only self-dual member of the second family
is a \reverse" of the Talmud rule (Section 6).
Finally, we investigate the existence of \consistent" members of the fam-
ilies. Consistency relates the recommendations made for problems involving
di®erent sets of claimants. It says that the awards vector selected for some
problem need not be revised after some claimants have left with their awards
and the situation is reevaluated at that point. The constrained equal awards,
constrained equal losses, and Talmud rules are consistent members of the ¯rst
family. Are there others? The answer is yes and we o®er a characterization
of the subfamily they constitute (Section 7). If we also require that when
claims and endowment are multiplied by the same positive number, so is
the chosen awards vector|this is the property called \homogeneity"|we
obtain a one-parameter subfamily, introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar
(2006a). (The parameter is a point in the unit interval.) We also characterize
a similarly de¯ned one-parameter subfamily of the second family on the basis
of homogeneity and consistency.
2 The model of adjudication of con°icting
claims
A group N of agents have claims on a resource, ci 2 R+ being the claim of
agent i 2 N and c ´ (ci)i2N the vector of claims. Initially, N is some ¯nite
2subset of the set of natural numbers N. Using the notation RN
+ for the cross-
product of jNj copies of R+ indexed by the members of N,3 the claims vector
is therefore an element of RN
+. There is an endowment E of the resource,
and this endowment is insu±cient to honor all of the claims. Altogether, a
claims problem, or simply a problem, is a pair (c;E) 2 RN
+ £ R+ such that P
ci ¸ E. Let CN denote the domain of all problems.
A division rule, or simply a rule, is a function that associates with each
problem (c;E) 2 CN a vector x 2 RN such that 0 5 x 5 c and satisfying the
e±ciency condition
P
xi = E. Such an x is an awards vector for (c;E).
Let X(c;E) be the set of these vectors.
We use two kinds of graphical representations for a rule. First, for each
claims vector, we plot in a Euclidean space of dimension equal to the num-
ber of claimants the awards vector chosen by the rule as a function of the
endowment. The locus of this vector is the path of awards of the rule for
the claims vector. This representation is limited to the two- and three-
claimant cases but nevertheless it is very useful for proofs. Alternatively,
we plot the award to each claimant as a function of the endowment. The
graphs of the resulting functions are the schedules of awards of the rule
for the claims vector. This representation accommodates any number of
claimants.
Other notation: Given N 2 N, we write n for jNj. Let e: R+ ! R+ be
the identity function: for each c0 2 R+, e(c0) = c0.
3 Four important rules
The following are important rules in the literature. They will be central to
our analysis as well. The ¯rst two implement the idea of equality, of awards
on the one hand, subject to claims boundedness, and of losses on the other
hand, subject to non-negativity:
Constrained equal awards rule, CEA: For each (c;E) 2 CN and each
i 2 N, CEAi(c;E) ´ minfci;¸g, where ¸ is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.
3The superscript N indicates a cross-product of objects indexed by the members of
the set N, or more generally it refers to a set pertaining to the agents in N. Which
interpretation is intended should be unambiguous from the context.
3Constrained equal losses rule, CEL: For each (c;E) 2 CN and each
i 2 N, CELi(c;E) ´ maxf0;ci ¡ ¸g, where ¸ is chosen so as to achieve
e±ciency.
The next rule was critical in leading to the formulation of the families we
introduce here. It was initially de¯ned so as to make sense of the resolutions
proposed in the Talmud for certain problems. The story has been told many
times (O'Neill, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985) but it bears repeating. In
the contested garment problem, two men disagree over the ownership of a
garment, worth 200, say. The ¯rst man claims half of it (100) and the other
claims it all (200). The Talmud recommends the division g ´ (50;150).4
For the estate division problem, a man has three wives whose marriage
contracts specify that upon his death, they should receive 100, 200, and 300
respectively. The man dies and his estate is found to be worth only 100.
The Talmud recommends e ´ (331
3;331
3;331
3). If the estate is worth 200,
it recommends k ´ (50;75;75), and if it is worth 300, it recommends p ´
(50;100;150).5 The rule, proposed by Aumann and Maschler, can be thought
of as a hybrid of the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses
rules. It is de¯ned as follows (Figure 1):











where in each case, ¸ is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.
The following historical precedent, called Ibn Ezra's problem (12th Cen-
tury)6 is not as well-known, but it is the main rationale for the rule de¯ned
next, as it was for an incompletely speci¯ed rule due to Rabad7. It too has
been important in providing motivation for the introduction of our fami-
lies. A man dies whose estate is worth 120. He has four sons, to whom he
4See Baba Metzia 2a. References to the relevant passages of the Talmud are taken from
O'Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985), and Dagan (1996).
5Kethubot 93a; the author of this Mishna is Rabbi Nathan.
6This attribution is by O'Neill (1982). O'Neill notes several of the properties of the
rule de¯ned below. Another rule that also delivers Ibn Ezra's numbers is proposed by
Berganti~ nos and M¶ endez-Naya (2001) and Alcalde, Marco, and Silva (2005).
7Rabad's rule is de¯ned only for claims problem in which the endowment is no greater
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Figure 1: Schedules of awards for the Talmud rule, proposed by Aumann
and Maschler to rationalize the recommendations made in the Talmud
for the contested garment and estate division problems. The award vectors
found in the Talmud are indicated as dots. (a) For the contested garment problem,
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Figure 2: Schedules of awards for the minimal overlap rule, proposed by
O'Neil to rationalize Ibn Ezra's recommendation for an estate division
problem. (a) Two-claimant problem. In that case, the minimal overlap rule
coincides with the Talmud rule. (b) The estate division problem of the Talmud.
The general shape of each schedule of awards is the same as for the Talmud rule,
but the breakpoints are di®erent.











1 ). O'Neill (1982) proposed the
following rule to rationalize these numbers (Figure 2):
Minimal overlap rule, MO: Claims on speci¯c parts of the endowment are
arranged so that the part that is claimed by exactly one claimant (whoever
he is; di®erent subparts can be claimed by di®erent claimants) is maximized,
and for each k = 2;:::;n ¡ 1 successively, subject to the previous k maxi-
mizations being solved, the part that is claimed by exactly k + 1 claimants
(whoever they are; each subpart can be claimed by di®erent sets of k + 1
claimants) is maximized. Once claims are arranged in this way, for each
part of the endowment, equal division prevails among all agents claiming it.
Each claimant receives the sum of the partial compensations coming from
the various parts that he claimed.
Formulae for the rule are available (O'Neill, 1982; Chun and Thomson,
2005; Alcalde, Marco, and Silva, 2007).
It is of interest that the Talmud and minimal overlap rules coincide in
the two-claimant case, and that they also coincide with the rule based on
the following scenario: each claimant concedes to the other the di®erence
6between the endowment and his claim (or 0 if this di®erence is negative), and
whatever remains is divided equally between them (Aumann and Maschler,
1985). We refer to it as concede-and-divide.
4 A new family of rules, the ICI family
Although the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules
clearly enter as ingredients into the de¯nition of the Talmud rule, the con-
siderations underlying the de¯nition of the minimal overlap rule seem to be
far removed from those that underlie these three rules. Nevertheless, we will
see that a very simple general formula exists that delivers all four as special
cases.
We noted that in the two-claimant case, the minimal overlap and Talmud
rules both coincide with concede-and-divide, but in fact many other rules do
too. Without giving formal de¯nitions, let us only mention (i) the random
arrival rule (O'Neill, 1982), de¯ned by imagining that claimants arrive in
random order to get compensated, and fully compensating each of them until
money runs out, (ii) the version of the constrained equal awards rule obtained
by ¯rst assigning to each claimant his \minimal right" (the di®erence between
the endowment and the sum of the claims of the other agents if this di®erence
is non-negative, and 0 otherwise), and (iii) the version of the constrained
equal losses rule obtained by ¯rst truncating claims at the endowment. If
there are more than two claimants, these various rules usually make di®erent
recommendations.
Figure 1b, which illustrates the Talmud rule in the three-claimant case,
and Figure 2b, which illustrates the minimal overlap rule, also in the three-
claimant case, reveal a striking resemblance between them. What is similar
is not just the fact that their schedules of awards are piece-wise linear|many
other rules exhibit this feature, including all of the rules just enumerated|
but mainly the pattern of increases in awards as the endowment increases.
For each claims vector, the award to each claimant increases initially, then it
remains constant, then it increases again until the claimant is fully compen-
sated; moreover, any two awards that are increasing at any given moment do
so at the same rate. For each of the two rules, each claims vector, and each
claimant, the interval of constancy of his award depends on where his claim
stands in the ordered list of claims.
Let us then consider all rules exhibiting these features. We designate
7the family they constitute by the name of \Increasing-Constant-Increasing"
family, or ICI family for short (the interval in which a claimant's award is
increasing can be subdivided into subintervals in which the rate of increase
is constant; for the agent with the largest claim, the interval of constancy
is actually degenerate), and let us refer to each member of the family as an
ICI rule. Proceeding in this way is justi¯ed as follows. If the endowment is
very small, di®erences in claims can be judged irrelevant, and equal shares
make sense, as \consolation prizes". As the endowment increases, at some
point, it is felt that the agent with the smallest claim starts receiving too
large a percentage of his claim, so he is excluded from receiving a share of
new increments. Di®erences in the claims of the others might still be judged
irrelevant, at least for a while, and we continue with equal division for them
until it is felt that the agent with the second smallest claim starts receiving
too large a percentage of his claim. Then, he is dropped o® too and we
continue with equal division for the remaining n ¡ 2 claimants, and so on.
We proceed until agent n¡1 has been dropped o® and for a while, agent n is
the only recipient. Then claimants return in the order of decreasing claims.
The richness of the family comes from the considerable freedom one has in
choosing the various points at which claimants are dropped o® and picked up
again, and in particular from the fact that these drop-o® and pick-up points
may depend on the claims vector.
Here is the general de¯nition of the family. Its members are indexed by
a list H ´ (Fk;Gk)
n¡1
k=1 of pairs of functions from RN
+ to R+ such that for
each c 2 RN
+, the sequence (Fk(c))
n¡1
k=1 is nowhere decreasing, the sequence
(Gk(c))
n¡1
k=1 is nowhere increasing, G1(c) ·
P
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As we will see, the reason for these relations is that, when the endowment
reaches
P
ci, each claimant should be fully compensated. Let us refer to
them as the ICI relations, and let us denote by HN the family of lists
H ´ (Fk;Gk)
n¡1
k=1 of pairs of functions satisfying them. The ICI relations are
8not independent; multiplying the ¯rst one through by n, the second one by
n¡1, ..., and the last one by 1, gives new relations whose sum is an identity.
When agents have equal claims, the ICI relations imply that successive
Fk's and the corresponding Gk's are equal. Then, these agents drop out and
come back together.
For each k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1, let ±k(c)´ Gk(c) ¡ Fk(c). Interestingly, the
sequence (±k(c))
n¡1
k=1 is the same for all functions H 2 HN, as the following
calculations show:
±1(c) = ¡(n ¡ 1)c1 + c2 + c3 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡1 + cn
±2(c) = ¡(n ¡ 2)c2 + c3 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡1 + cn
¢¢¢ = + ¢¢¢ + ¢¢¢ + cn¡1 + cn
±n¡2(c) = ¡2cn¡2 + cn¡1 + cn
±n¡1(c) = ¡cn¡1 + cn




k=1 such that F1(c) ¸ 0. The sequence (Gk(c))
n¡1
k=1
can then be recovered from (Fk(c))
n¡1
k=1 by adding (±k(c))
n¡1
k=1. It should be
nowhere increasing and such that G1(c) ·
P
ci. Alternatively, we can start
from the sequence (Gk(c))
n¡1
k=1 and derive the sequence (Fk(c))
n¡1
k=1 from it by
subtracting the sequence (±k(c))
n¡1
k=1.
ICI rule associated with H ´ (Fk;Gk)
k=n¡1
k=1 2 HN, RH: For each
c 2 RN
+ with c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn say, the awards vector chosen by RH is
given by the following algorithm. As the endowment ¯rst increases from 0 to
F1(c), equal division prevails. As it increases from F1(c) to F2(c), claimant 1's
award remains constant, and equal division of each increment prevails among
the others. As it increases from F2(c) to F3(c), claimants 1 and 2's awards
remain constant, and equal division of each increment prevails among the
others. ...This process goes on until the endowment reaches Fn¡1(c). As it
increases from Fn¡1(c) to Gn¡1(c), each increment goes entirely to claimant n.
As it increases from Gn¡1(c) to Gn¡2(c), equal division of each increment
prevails between claimants n and n¡1. ...This process goes on until the en-
dowment reaches G1(c), after which each increment is divided equally among
all claimants, until all are fully compensated.
Next, we show that the process just described does deliver a well-de¯ned
rule, referring to the stages into which it is divided as \steps". There are
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ci
Figure 3: Schedule of awards of a four-claimant ICI rule for a particular
claims vector. Let f1 ´ F1(c) and for k = 2;3, let fk ´ Fk(c) ¡ Fk¡1(c).
Let g1 ´
P
ci ¡ G1(c), and for k = 2;3, let gk ´ Gk(c) ¡ Gk¡1(c). Finally, let
d ´ G3(c) ¡ F3(c).
F1(c)
n , and at Step 2n ¡ 1 (the last step) by
P
ci¡G1(c)
n , for a total of c1 (by
the ¯rst ICI relation). Claimant 2's award increases along with claimant 1's
award on both occasions and at the same rate, also for a total of c1; in
addition, it increases at Step 2 by
F2(c)¡F1(c)
n¡1 and at Step 2n¡2 by
G1(c)¡G2(c)
n¡1 .
Altogether then, he ends up with c2 (by the second ICI relation). Similar
statements can be made about the remaining claimants.
The schedules of awards of a four-claimant ICI rule for a particular claims
vector are illustrated in Figure 3.
The family HN is convex: a convex combination of members of the family
is also a member of the family. However, the ICI family itself is not a convex
family.8
Next, we show that the four rules de¯ned in Section 3 are ICI rules. We
will need the following lemma, which concerns the minimal overlap rule:
Lemma 1 (O'Neill, 1982) Up to relabelling of parts of the endowment, there
is a unique arrangement of claims achieving minimal overlap. It is obtained
8In fact, a non-trivial convex combination of two members of the family is never a
member of the family. We could say that the family is \nowhere convex".
10as follows:
Case 1: There is j 2 N such that cj ¸ E. Then, each agent i 2 N such
that ci ¸ E claims [0;E] and each other agent i claims [0;ci] (nesting
of claims occurs).
Case 2: maxfcjg < E. Let t(E) be the solution to the equation in t, P
i2N : ci>t(ci ¡ t) = E ¡ t. Then,
(a) each agent i 2 N such that ci · t(E) claims [0;ci];
(b) each agent i 2 N such that ci ¸ t(E) claims [0;t(E)] as well as
a part of [t(E);E] of size ci ¡ t(E), with no overlap among the
subsets of [t(E);E] claimed by any two of these agents.
Lemma 2 The constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, Talmud,
and minimal overlap rules are ICI rules.
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn.
(a) Constrained equal awards rule: For each c 2 RN
+, set F(c) ´ (nc1;c1+
(n¡1)c2;:::;c1+c2+¢¢¢+ck¡1+(n¡k+1)ck;:::;c1+c2+¢¢¢+cn¡2+2cn¡1).
(b) Constrained equal losses rule: For each c 2 RN
+, set F(c) ´ (0;:::;0).
(c) Talmud rule: For each c 2 RN
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k=n¡1






(d) Minimal overlap rule: We show that the schedules of payments follow
the pattern de¯ning the ICI family, in the process identifying the function
H 2 HN associated with the rule. As long as E · cn¡1, Case 1 of Lemma 1
applies. Indeed, as E increases from 0 to c1, equal division among all agents
prevails. As E increases from c1 to c2, equal division of each increment
prevails among agents 2,..., n. Thus, F1(c) = c1. As E increases from c2 to
c3, equal division of each increment prevails among agents 3,..., n. Thus,
F2(c) = c2. This goes on until E = cn¡1. Thus, Fn¡1(c) = cn¡1. As E
increases beyond cn¡1, and until E = cn, agent n receives each increment.
As E increases from cn to
P
ci, Case 2 of Lemma 1 applies. When E = cn,
agent n¡1 returns. Thus, Gn¡1(c) = cn. As E increases from cn, the equation
to solve is
P
i2fn¡1;ng(ci¡t) = E¡t. Its solution t(E) satis¯es cn¡2 < t(E) <
cn¡1. Each increment is divided equally between claimants n¡1 and n. When
E increases further, the equation to solve is
P













































Figure 4: Paths of awards of two-claimant ICI rules for a particular
claims vector. The claimant set is N ´ f1;2g and c1 < c2. The four panels
represent paths of awards of ICI rules associated with progressively greater and
greater values of the endowment at which the kinks in the paths, a(c) and b(c),
occur. At one extreme (panel (a)), when they lie on the vertical axis, we obtain
the constrained equal losses rule. At the other extreme (panel (d)), when they lie
on the vertical line passing through the claims vector, we obtain the constrained
equal awards rule. Panel (b) shows the Talmud rule.
Its solution t(E) is such that cn¡3 < t(E) < cn¡2. Each increment is divided
equally between claimants n, n ¡ 1, and n ¡ 2. At the (n ¡ k)-th step, as
E increases further, the equation to solve is
P
i2fk;:::;n¡1;ng(ci ¡ t) = E ¡ t.
Its solution t(E) is such that ck¡1 < t(E) < ck. Each increment is divided
equally between claimants n, n ¡ 1, ..., and n ¡ k. At the (n ¡ 2)-th step,
the equation to solve is
P
i2f2;:::;n¡1;ng(ci ¡ t) = E ¡ t. At the last step, the
equation to solve is
P
N(ci ¡ t) = E ¡ t. Altogether then, in each of the
intervals into which we just divided the range of variation of the endowment,
all agents who are included share each increment equally.
Thus, the minimal overlap rule is the ICI rule associated with the function
H = (F;G) 2 HN given by F(c) = (c1;c2;:::;cn¡1) and G(c) = (¡(n¡2)c1+
c2 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡1 + cn;¡(n ¡ 3)c2 + c3 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡1 + cn;:::;¡(k ¡ 1)cn¡k +
cn¡k+1 + ¢¢¢ + cn;:::;¡cn¡2 + cn¡1 + cn;cn). ¤
If jNj = 2, the list H has only one term (F1;G1), with for each c 2 RN
+,
F1(c) and G1(c) satisfying the ICI relations|there are two of them then|
but given the dependence between these relations, we obtain a one-parameter
family, the parameter being a function of c. This family \connects" the
constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, passing through
concede-and-divide, (which, in the two-claimant case, is also the minimal
12overlap rule). The paths of awards are easily determined (Figure 4). Let
N ´ f1;2g. If c1 = c2, the path is seg[(0;0);c]. If c1 < c2, the path consists





segment is degenerate if F1(c) = 0), the vertical segment with endpoints a(c)
and b(c) ´ a(c) + (0;c2 ¡ c1), and the segment connecting b(c) to c (this
segment has slope 1; it is degenerate if G1(c) =
P
ci). We noted earlier that
the family HN is convex. Now, let S and S0 be two ICI rules, associated with
the functions H and H0 2 HN. Then, for each c 2 RN
+, the path of awards
of the rule associated with a convex combination of H and H0 is a convex
combination of the paths of S and S0 parallel to the 45± line. Each line of
slope 1 that intersects the path of S also intersects the path of S0. Then,
we take the convex combination of these points of intersection (sometimes,
segments of intersection).
Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006a) propose a family of rules indexed by
a point in the unit interval. This family happens to be a subfamily of the
ICI family. Let µ 2 [0;1]. Assuming c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn, simply choose
F(c) ´ µ(nc1;c1 +(n¡1)c2;¢¢¢ ;c1 +c2 +¢¢¢+ck¡1 +(n¡k +1)ck;:::;c1 +
c2 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡2 + 2cn¡1). Let T µ denote the rule associated with µ in this
manner, and fT µgµ2[0;1] be the resulting family. Note that T 0 = CEL,
T 1 = CEA, and T
1
2 = T.
The paths of awards of two-claimant ICI rules are depicted in Figure 4.
For each µ 2 [0;1], the rule T µ is obtained when a(c) takes the simple form
a(c) = (2µminfcig;2µminfcig). Thus, in the two-claimant case, the path of
T µ has the same shape as for any ICI rule, but each T µ can be recovered
from only one of its paths, whereas for a general ICI rule, the kinks in paths
of awards can depend in some arbitrary manner on the claims vector.
5 Reverse family: the CIC family
A reverse algorithm to the one underlying the de¯nition of the ICI family sug-
gests itself: instead of beginning with equal division and dropping claimants
in succession, starting with the ones with the smallest claims, we start by giv-
ing everything to claimant n and progressively enlarge the set of recipients,
adding agents in the order of decreasing claims. More precisely, claimant n
is the only one in until the endowment reaches a ¯rst critical value, at which
point claimant n ¡ 1 enters the scene. Then, claimants n and n ¡ 1 share
equally each increment until the endowment reaches a second critical value.
13Then, claimants n, n ¡ 1, and n ¡ 2 share equally each increment ...This
process goes on until claimant 1 enters the scene, at which point all claimants
share equally each increment. At some point, claimant 1 is fully compensated
and is dropped o®. Then, equal division of each increment prevails among
claimants 2 through n until claimant 2 is fully compensated, and is dropped
o® and so on. During the last step, claimant n is the only one left. We refer
to a rule so de¯ned as an CIC rule, this acronym re°ecting the fact that
each claimant's award is ¯rst Constant, then Increasing, then Constant. The
family so obtained is the CIC family.




+ to R+, where n ´ jNj, satisfying properties parallel to those imposed on
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Here too, the relations are not independent: multiplying the ¯rst one
through by n, the second one by n ¡ 1, ..., and the last one by 1, gives
new relations whose sum is an identity. Let ¹ HN be the family of pairs of
functions satisfying these relations.
If agents have equal claims, the CIC relations imply that these agents
come in and drop out together.
CIC rule associated with H ´ (Fk;Gk)
k=n¡1
k=1 2 ¹ HN, RH: For each
c 2 RN
+ with c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn say, the awards vector chosen by RH is
given by the following algorithm. As the endowment ¯rst increases from 0
to F1(c), everything goes to claimant n. As it increases from F1(c) to F2(c),
equal division of each increment prevails between claimants n and n¡1. As
it increases from F2(c) to F3(c), equal division of each increment prevails
among claimants n, n¡1, and n¡2...This process goes on until claimant 1
enters the scene, at which point equal division of each increment prevails






























F1(c) F2(c) F3(c) G3(c) G2(c) G1(c)6
P
ci
Figure 5: Schedules of awards of a four-claimant CIC rule for a partic-
ular claims vector. Let f1 ´ F1(c) and for k = 2;3, let fk ´ Fk(c) ¡ Fk¡1(c).
Let g1 ´
P
ci ¡ G1(c) and for k = 2;3, let gk ´ Gk(c) ¡ Gk¡1(c). Finally, let
d ´ G3(c) ¡ F3(c).
fully compensated and is dropped o®. Then equal division of each increment
prevails among claimants 2 through n until, when the endowment is equal to
Gn¡2(c), claimant 2 is fully compensated and is dropped o®, and so on. At
the end of the process, claimant n is the only one left, and he receives each
increment until he is fully compensated.
The schedules of awards of a four-claimant CIC rule for a particular claims
vector are illustrated in Figure 5.
For each k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1, let ²k(c) ´ Gk(c) ¡ Fk(c). The sequence
(²k(c))
n¡1
k=1 is the same for all members of the ICI family, as the following
calculations show:9
²1(c) = c1 + c2 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡3 + cn¡2 + 2cn¡1
²2(c) = c1 + c2 + ¢¢¢ + cn¡3 + 3cn¡2
¢¢¢ = ¢¢¢ + ¢¢¢ + ¢¢¢ + ¢¢¢
²n¡2(c) = c1 + (n ¡ 1)c2
²n¡1(c) = nc1
An alternative way to describe a member of the CIC family is to specify
for each c 2 RN
+ a sequence (Fk(c))
n¡1
k=1. The sequence (Gk(c))
n¡1
k=1 can then
be recovered from (Fk(c))
n¡1
k=1 by adding (²k(c))
n¡1
k=1. The sequence (Fk(c))
n¡1
k=1
should be nowhere decreasing and such that F1(0) ¸ 0 and the sequence
(Gk(c))
n¡1
k=1 should be nowhere increasing and such that G1(c) ·
P
ci.
9We have ±1 + ²n¡1 = ±2 + ²n¡2 = ¢¢¢ = ±n¡1 + ²1 =
P
ci.
15The next lemma identi¯es three rules as CIC rules. Interestingly, two of
them are the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules,
which as we saw, also belong to the ICI family. The third one is de¯ned like
the Talmud rule, which we described as a hybrid of the constrained equal
awards and constrained equal losses rules, by exchanging the order in which
these component rules are applied. For that reason, we name it the reverse
Talmud rule.10
Lemma 3 The constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and re-
verse Talmud rules are CIC rules.
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn.
(a) Constrained equal awards rule: For each c 2 RN
+, set F(c) ´
(0;0;:::;0).
(b) Constrained equal losses rule: For each c 2 RN
+, set F(c) ´ (cn ¡
cn¡1;cn + cn¡1 ¡ 2cn¡2;:::;cn + cn¡1 + ¢¢¢ + c2 ¡ (n ¡ 1)c1).
(c) Reverse Talmud rule: For each c 2 RN




















(then, the sequence (Gk(c))
k=n¡1






A subfamily of CIC rules parallel to fT µgµ2[0;1] can be de¯ned. Let µ 2
[0;1]. Assuming c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn, let us choose F(c) ´ µ(¡cn¡1 +
cn;¡2cn¡2 + cn¡1 + cn;¢¢¢ ;¡kcn¡k + cn¡k+1 + ¢¢¢ + cn + ¢¢¢ ;¡(n ¡ 1)c1 +
c2 +¢¢¢+cn). Let Uµ denote the rule associated with µ in this manner, and
fUµgµ2[0;1] be the resulting family. Note that U0 = CEA, U1 = CEL, and
U
1
2 = T r.
The paths of awards of two-claimant CIC rules are depicted in Figure 6.
Let N ´ f1;2g and c 2 RN with c1 < c2. Then, for each µ 2 [0;1], the rule
Uµ is obtained when a(c) = (0;µ(c2 ¡ c1)). A comment similar to one we
made for the ICI rules applies: in the two-claimant case, the path of Uµ has
the same shape as for any CIC rule, but each Uµ can be recovered from only
one of its paths, whereas for a general CIC rule, the kinks in paths of awards
can depend in some arbitrary manner on the claims vector.










































Figure 6: Paths of awards of two-claimant CIC rules for a particular
claims vector. The claimant set is N ´ f1;2g and c1 < c2. The four panels
represent paths of awards of CIC rules associated with progressively greater and
greater values of the endowment at which the kinks in the paths, a(c) and b(c),
occur. At one extreme (panel (a)), when the kinks belong to the 45± line, we
obtain the constrained equal awards rule. At the other extreme (panel (d)), when
they lie on the line of slope 1 passing through the claims vector, we obtain the
constrained equal losses rule. Panel (b) shows the reverse Talmud rule.
6 Basic properties of the ICI and CIC rules
In this section, we identify basic properties of the ICI and CIC rules. Several
are obviously satis¯ed by each of them. Other properties are met if the
functions with which a rule is associated (a pair H = (F;G) 2 HN for an ICI
rule and a pair H = (F;G) 2 ¹ HN for a CIC rule) satisfy certain restrictions
that we identify.
Obviously, each ICI rule awards equal amounts to agents with equal
claims, that is, satis¯es equal treatment of equals. In fact, each of them
satis¯es order preservation of awards: if agent i's claim is at least as
large as agent j's claim, he receives at least as much as agent j does; and
each satis¯es order preservation of losses, which says that under the same
hypotheses, agent i's loss is at least as large as agent j's loss (Aumann and
Maschler, 1985). Also, for each of them, the names of claimants do not mat-
ter, a property called anonymity. Each is also such that if the endowment
increases, each claimant receives at least as much as he did initially: they are
resource monotonic. Each is resource continuous: a small change in the
endowment does not lead to a large change in the recommended awards. An
ICI rule associated with a continuous H is continuous: small changes in the
data of the problem (claims and endowment) do not produce large changes in
17the recommended awards. Homogeneity says that if claims and endowment
are multiplied by the same positive number, then so should all awards. An
ICI rule is homogenous if it is associated with a pair H = (F;G) 2 HN that is
homogeneous of degree 1 (for each c 2 RN
+ and each ® 2 R+, H(®c) = ®H(c).
It su±ces to check homogeneity of F; homogeneity of G follows from the ICI
relations.)
Similar observations hold for the CIC family.
Next, we consider the requirement that what is available (the endowment)
should be divided symmetricly to what is missing (the de¯cit):11
Self-duality: For each (c;E) 2 CN, S(c;E) = c ¡ S(c;
P
ci ¡ E).
Two rules S and R are dual if for each (c;E) 2 CN, S(c;E) = c ¡
R(c;
P
ci ¡ E). A family of rules is closed under duality if whenever it
contains a rule, it also contains its dual.
The following proposition collects a number of observations pertaining to
duality about the ICI and CIC families. (Parallel statements concerning the
family fT µgµ2[0;1] are established by Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006a.)
Proposition 1 (a) The only self-dual ICI rule is the Talmud rule.
(b) The only self-dual CIC rule is the reverse Talmud rule.
(c) The ICI family is closed under duality.
(d) The CIC family is closed under duality.
Proof: (a) For a rule to be self-dual, for each c 2 RN
+, the graph of the
function giving each claimant i's award as a function of the endowment should




2 ). For the ICI rule associated
with H ´ (F;G) 2 HN, this is equivalent to requiring that, starting with
the agent with the smallest claim, F1(c) and
P
ci ¡ G1(c) should be equal.
Thus, the sum F1(c) + G1(c) is known. Since the di®erence F1(c) ¡ G1(c)
is given by the ¯rst ICI relation, the numbers F1(c) and G1(c) are uniquely
determined. Turning to the agent with the second smallest claim, and using
the second ICI relation, we deduce that F2(c) and G2(c) are also uniquely
determined. Proceeding by induction, we establish uniqueness of each pair
(Fk(c);Gk(c)) for k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1. But then, we have obtained the Talmud
rule.
11The condition is formulated by Aumann and Maschler (1985), who note a number of
passages in the Talmud where the idea is implicit.
18(b) The reasoning is similar. Again, we start with the agent with the




ci of Fn¡1(c) and Gn¡1(c). By turning to the agent with the second
smallest claim, we then obtain the symmetry of Fn¡2(c) and Gn¡2(c), and so
on. Altogether, we derive the reverse Talmud rule.
(c) Let S be the ICI rule associated with H ´ (F;G) 2 HN. For each
c 2 RN
+, and each k 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g, let Gd
k(c) ´
P
ci ¡ Fk(c) and F d
k(c) ´ P
ci ¡ Gk(c). It is easy to see that the function Hd ´ (Gd;F d) so de¯ned
satis¯es the ICI relations, and that the ICI rule associated with Gd is indeed
the dual of S.
(d) The proof is similar to that of (c) and we omit it. ¤
7 Consistency
Next we consider a variable-population version of the model. There is an
in¯nite set of \potential" claimants, indexed by the natural numbers N. In
each given problem, however, only a ¯nite number of them are present. Let N
be the class of ¯nite subsets of N. Here, a problem is a pair (c;E) 2 RN
+£R+,
where N 2 N, such that
P
N ci ¸ E. A rule is a function de¯ned over the
domain C ´
S
N2N CN consisting of all problems involving some population
in N, which associates with each N 2 N and each (c;E) 2 CN a vector in
X(c;E). Given N 2 N, we refer to the restriction of a rule to the subdomain
CN as its \N-component". What we call an \ICI rule" or a \CIC rule" is a
rule whose components are rules as de¯ned in Sections 4 and 5 respectively.
Our central property of a rule here is designed to relate the recommen-
dations it makes as the population of claimants changes. Let N 2 N and
(c;E) 2 CN. Apply the rule to (c;E) and let x be the awards vector that
it selects. Now, imagine that some claimants receive their awards and leave.
Let N0 denote the set of remaining claimants. The situation, re-evaluated
at that point, can be seen as the problem whose agent set is N0 and whose
endowment is the di®erence between the initial endowment and the sum of
the amounts assigned to the departing claimants, namely E¡
P
N0 xi. Equiv-
alently, the revised endowment is the sum
P
N0 xi of the amounts initially
assigned to the remaining claimants. The pair (cN0;
P
N0 xi) is the reduced
problem of (c;E) with respect to N0 and x. By de¯nition of a rule, for




N0 ci, and we do obtain a well-de¯ned
19claims problem. We require that for this problem, the rule should award to
each remaining claimant the same amount as it did initially.12
Consistency: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each N0 ½ N, if
x ´ S(c;E), then xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xi).
Our next theorem describes the subfamily of the ICI family of consis-
tent rules. It is well-known that the constrained equal awards, constrained
equal losses, and Talmud rules are consistent (Young, 1987). Thus, they are
examples of consistent ICI rules (the minimal overlap rule is not consistent
however.13) To obtain a complete description, let ¡ be the class of nowhere
decreasing functions °: R+ ! R+ such that °(0) = 0 and the function e¡°
is also nowhere decreasing. (These requirements imply that ° is continuous.)
To each ° 2 ¡ we associate a rule as follows. Let us denote by ~ c the vector
in Rn
+ obtained from c by writing its coordinates in increasing order.
ICI* rule associated with ° 2 ¡, S°: For each N 2 N and each c 2 RN
+,





k=1 = (n°(~ c1);°(~ c1)+(n¡1)°(~ c2);:::;°(~ c1)+ °(~ c2)+¢¢¢ +
°(~ cn¡2) + 2°(~ cn¡1)), (Gk(c))
n¡1
k=1 being obtained from (Fk(c))
n¡1
k=1 by means of
the ICI relations.
12The ¯rst application of consistency ideas in the context of the current model is due
to Aumann and Maschler (1985). For a survey of the consistency principle, see Thomson
(1999).
13It does not satisfy the self-explanatory property of replication invariance, as noted by
Chun and Thomson (2005). This can be proved in two ways. First, since equal treatment of
equals and consistency imply replication invariance and the rule satis¯es equal treatment
of equals and violates replication invariance, it violates consistency. To see a violation
of replication invariance, let N ´ f1;2g and (c;E) 2 CN be de¯ned by c ´ (2;4) and
E ´ 2. Then, MO(c;E) = (1;1). Now, let N0 ´ f1;:::;4g and (c0;E0) 2 CN
0
be de¯ned




2). Claimants 1 and 2
are not getting the same amounts in the initial problem and in the problem obtained by
introducing two new claimants with claims equal to theirs, and doubling the endowment.
Violations of consistency can also be established directly, starting from a three-claimant
example. Let N ´ f1;2;3g and (c;E) 2 CN be de¯ned by c ´ (3;6;6) and E ´ 7. Then
MO(c;E) = (1;3;3). If claimant 3 leaves with his award, the set of remaining claimants
is f1;2g, their claims are still (3;6) and the endowment is 7¡3. For this reduced problem,
the minimal overlap rule recommends (1:5;2:5). (In this problem, agent 2's claim is greater
than the endowment, and its minimal overlap awards vector is obtained by nesting claims.)
20If ° = e, S° = CEA; if ° = 0, S° = CEL; and if ° = e
2, S° = T.
A parametric rule (Young, 1987) S is such that there is a continuous
function f : R+ £ ¤ ! R, where ¤ = [¸; ¹ ¸] is an interval in R, with the
property that for each c0 2 R+, f(c0;¸) = 0 and f(c0; ¹ ¸) = c0, and f(c0;¢) is
nowhere decreasing; then, for each N 2 N and each (c;E) 2 CN, S(c;E) =
(f(ci;¸))i2N, where ¸ 2 ¤ is such that
P
f(ci;¸) = E. Any such ¸ is
called an equilibrium ¸. The function f is a parametric representation
of S. Parametric representations of a parametric rule are not unique. All
parametric rules are consistent. Of particular interest for us is the following:
Lemma 4 The ICI* rules are parametric rules.
Proof: Let ° 2 ¡. We simply exhibit a representation f of S° (Figure 7a).
Let ¸ = 0, ¹ ¸ > 0, and ¸¤ 2]¸; ¹ ¸[. Let A be the graph of a continuous and
increasing function g de¯ned on [0;¸¤[ such that g(0) = 0 and g(¸) ! 1 as
¸ ! ¸¤. Let h: R+ ! R+ be a continuous and increasing function such that
h(0) = 0 and h(c0) ! ¹ ¸ ¡ ¸¤ as c0 ! 1. Let B° ´ f(¹ ¸ ¡ h(c0);°(c0)): c0 2
R+g. Let C° ´ f(¹ ¸ ¡ h(c0);°(c0) ¡ c0): c0 2 R+g. Now, for each c0 2 R+,
let f(c0;¢): [¸; ¹ ¸] ! R+ be the function whose graph follows A from (0;0)
until the point of ordinate °(c0), continues horizontally until the point of
coordinates (¹ ¸ ¡ h(c0);°(c0)), and concludes with the part of C° + f(0;c0)g
that lies to the right of the vertical line of abscissa ¹ ¸ ¡ h(c0). It is easy to
see that the function f is well-de¯ned and satis¯es the properties listed in
the de¯nition of a parametric rule.
To see that indeed f is a parametric representation of S°, it is enough to
consider the two-claimant case, the logic being the same for the general case.
Let N ´ f1;2g and suppose that agent 1's claim is c0 and agent 2's claim c0
0.
The graphs of f(c0;¢) and f(c0
0;¢) are plotted in Figure 7b. As the endowment
increases from 0 to c0 +c0
0, the equilibrium ¸ increases from ¸ to ¹ ¸. Initially,
as both graphs follow A, we obtain equal division. At ¸ = ¸1, the graph
of f(c0;¢) becomes horizontal whereas that of f(c0
0;¢) is still going up, so
claimant 2 receives the totality of each increment. At ¸ = ¸2, claimant 2's
graph also becomes horizontal. We have a \dead interval" of values of ¸ in
which both awards are stationary. At ¸ = ¹ ¸¡h(c0
0), the graph of f(c0
0;¢) starts
going up again whereas that of f(c0;¢) is still horizontal. Thus, claimant 2
receives the totality of each increment. At ¸ = ¹ ¸¡h(c0), claimant 1's graph
starts going up too. Since the parts of the two graphs that we now follow
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Figure 7: Parametric representations of ICI* rules. (a) Schedule f(c0;¢)
of a parametric representation of the ICI* rule associated with some ° 2 ¡, S°.
(b) The schedules for claims c0 and c0
0 used to determine the path for (c0;c0
0).
shares of each increment. This goes on until both are fully compensated.
Altogether, we have obtained the path of S° for (c0;c0
0). ¤
If ° = e, B° is a copy of the graph of h turned counterclockwise 90 degrees
and C° is the horizontal segment ]¸¤; ¹ ¸] ½ R+; then, S° = CEA. If ° = 0,
B° is what C° is when ° = e and C° is the symmetric image with respect
to the horizontal axis of what B° is when ° = e; then S° = CEL (in this
case, A is not used). If ° = e
2, B° and C° are symmetric of each other with
respect to the horizontal axis; then, S° = T. For each µ 2 [0;1], if ° ´ µe,
then B° and C° are symmetric images with respect to the horizontal axis of
two curves that are vertical homothetic images of each other; then S° = T µ.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 repeatedly exploit Fact 1 below, which
is nothing other than a geometric restatement of consistency, the claims
vector being kept ¯xed, and the endowment varying from 0 to the sum of the
claims:14
14The line of reasoning is developed by Thomson (2007b), and illustrated there with
a series of examples. It is also applied in Thomson (2001, 2007a), Hokari and Thomson
(2003), and Dominguez and Thomson (2006).
22Fact 1: Let S be a consistent rule. Then, for each N 2 N and each c 2 RN
+,
the projection of the path of awards of S for c onto the subspace pertaining
to each N0 ½ N is a subset of its path for the projection of c onto RN0
+ .
Moreover, if S is resource continuous, coincidence occurs. (This is because
in that case, a path of awards is a continuous curve; by projection, we also
obtain a continuous curve.)
Fact 1 applies to our search for consistent ICI and CIC rules because
these rules are resource continuous, as noted in Section 6.
Another important logical relation involves anonymity, which has to be
restated for our variable population framework. In this context, this is the
requirement that not only within each group N 2 N, the names of claimants
should not matter, but also that two problems involving distinct groups
N;N0 2 N of the same size in which the ordered lists of claims are equal
and the endowments are equal too should be handled in the same way: a
member of N and a member of N0 whose claims are equal should receive
equal amounts.15
Lemma 5 (Chambers and Thomson, 2002) Equal treatment of equals and
consistency imply anonymity.
The following property of a rule will be useful in proving our next theorem.
Let N 2 N, (c;E) 2 CN, and x 2 X(c;E). If x is such that for each two-
claimant subgroup of N, its restriction to the subgroup is chosen by the rule
for the reduced problem with respect to the subgroup and x, then x should
be chosen by the rule for (c;E):
Converse consistency: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each
x 2 X(c;E), if for each N0 ½ N with jN0j = 2, we have xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xi),
then x = S(c;E).
The next lemma, whose proof is straightforward, is an important model-
free structural result that has appeared in numerous studies:16
15To illustrate the distinction, the rule that agrees with the constrained equal awards
rule for any problem involving claimant 1 and with the constrained equal losses rule for any
other problem satis¯es what could be called intra-group anonymity but not inter-group
anonymity.
16It is presented in this form by Thomson (1999).
23Lemma 6 (Elevator Lemma) If a rule is consistent and coincides with a
conversely consistent rule in the two-claimant case, then it coincides with it
for any number of claimants.
Here is our main result on consistency for the ICI rules.
Theorem 1 An ICI rule is consistent if and only if it is an ICI* rule.
Proof: Each ICI* rule is by de¯nition an ICI rule. It is consistent because it
is a parametric rule (Lemma 4) and parametric rules satisfy this property.17
Conversely, let S be a consistent ICI rule. Step 1 says that the middle
segments18 of the paths of the two-claimant components of S are related in
a special way.
Step 1: There is a function °: R+ ! R+ such that the following
holds. Let N 2 N with jNj = 2 and c 2 RN
++ be a claims vector of
unequal coordinates. Then, the common value of the coordinates
of the lowest endpoint of the middle segment in the path of S for
c is °(minci).
Let N ´ f1;2;3g and c 2 RN
+ be such that 0 < c1 < c2 < c3. Let
¦1, ¦2, and ¦3 be the paths of awards of S for (c2;c3), (c1;c3), and (c1;c2)
respectively, and ¦ be the path of S for c. By Fact 1, the projections of ¦
on each of the two-dimensional subspaces Rf1;2g, Rf1;3g, and Rf2;3g, are ¦3,
¦2, and ¦1 respectively.
Since 0 < c1 < c2, by de¯nition of an ICI rule, ¦3 contains a segment
parallel to Rf2g|let us denote its endpoints k1 and k2, with k1 · k2, and
since 0 < c1 < c3, ¦2 contains a segment parallel to Rf3g (Figure 8a). Let a1
and b1 be the ¯rst coordinates of these segments. We will show that a1 = b1.
Suppose by contradiction that a1 6= b1. Consider the plane in RN of
equation x1 = a1. Its intersection with ¦3 is seg[k1;k2] (Figure 8a) and its
17A direct proof of the consistency of the ICI* rules is as follows. Let ° 2 ¡ and
consider S°. Let N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN. Suppose ¯rst that E ·
P
N °(ci). Then, there
is k 2 f0;:::;jNjg such that each claimant i 2 N whose claim is among the k smallest
claims in c receives °(ci)|let ~ N be the set they constitute|and all others receive equal
amounts. Let N0 ½ N. Let ~ N0 ´ N0 \ ~ N. The members of ~ N0 have the smallest claims
in N0. Let us assign to each i 2 ~ N0 the amount °(ci) and to the others equal shares of
what is left. The claimants in N0n ~ N are the claimants in N n ~ N and this common amount
is what they had been assigned initially. The case E >
P
°(ci) can be analyzed similarly.
18The expression \middle segment" of a path is an abuse of language when either of the















































c2 ¡ c1 + °(c1)
c3 ¡ c1 + °(c1)
(b)
Figure 8: Proof of Theorem 1. (a) Step 1. Here, we show by contradiction
that the middle segments of the paths for cf1;2g and cf1;3g have to be in the same
plane parallel to the 2-3-coordinate subspace. This allow us to derive the existence
of the function °: R+ ! R+. (b) Step 3. To show that ° is nowhere decreasing,
we use seg[0;k1] in the path for cf1;2g and seg[0;`1] in the path for cf1;3g to deduce
seg[0;m1] in the path for c, from which we deduce seg[0;n1] in the path for cf2;3g.
To show that e¡° is nowhere decreasing, we use seg[k2;cf1;2g] in the path for cf1;2g
and seg[`2;cf1;3g] in the path for cf1;3g to deduce seg[m2;c] in the path for c, from
which we deduce seg[n2;cf2;3g] in the path for cf2;3g.
25intersection with ¦2 is a singleton, denoted `1. (Figure 8a shows the case a1 <
b1 but the argument is independent of whether a1 < b1 or a1 > b1.) Thus,
by Fact 1, ¦ contains the segment whose projection onto Rf1;2g is seg[k1;k2]





seg[m1;m2] in the ¯gure). The projection of this segment onto Rf2;3g is a




3)] (= seg[n1;n2]). By Fact 1,
this segment belongs to the path of S for (c2;c3). However, since 0 < c2 < c3,
the path of an ICI rule for (c2;c3) does not contain a segment parallel to Rf2g.
Thus, a1 = b1.
Appealing to the anonymity of S, which follows from Lemma 5 (this
lemma applies because the ICI rules satisfy equal treatment of equals), we
conclude the following. Let N 2 N with jNj = 2 and c 2 RN
++ of unequal
coordinates. Then, the common value of the coordinates of the lowest end-
point of the middle segment in the path of S for c is independent of who the
owner of the larger claim is (above, the owner of the larger claim in (c1;c2) is
claimant 2, and the owner of the larger claim in (c1;c3) is claimant 3). Also,
this common value is independent of who the owner of the smaller claim is
(there, for both (c1;c2) and (c1;c3), this owner is claimant 1). Thus, there is
°: R++ ! R+ as in the statement of Step 1.
If one or both coordinates of c are 0, the path of S for c is degenerate.
To cover this case, it su±ces to extend the domain of de¯nition of ° to R+
by setting °(0) = 0.
Step 2: The functions ° and e ¡ ° are nowhere decreasing. First,
we show that ° is nowhere decreasing. Let a;b 2 R++ be such a < b. Let
c 2 RN
+ be such that c1 = a, c2 = b, and c3 > c2. To show that °(a) · °(b), we
consider the claims vector c ´ (c1;c2;c3) (Figure 8b). By Step 1, the path of
S for (c1;c2) contains seg[(0;0);(°(c1);°(c1))] (= seg[(0;0);k1] on the ¯gure)
and its path for (c1;c3) contains seg[(0;0);(°(c1);°(c1))] (= seg[(0;0);`1]).
Thus, by Fact 1, its path for c contains seg[(0;0;0);(°(c1);°(c1);°(c1))] (=
seg[(0;0;0);m1]), and thus by Fact 1 again, projecting onto Rf2;3g, its path
for (c2;c3) contains seg[(0;0);(°(c1);°(c1))] (= seg[(0;0);n1]). By Step 1,
and since c2 < c3, the path of S for (c2;c3) contains seg[(0;0);(°(c2);°(c2))]
and it has a kink at (°(c2);°(c2)). These two conclusions can hold together
only if °(c2) ¸ °(c1).
Next, we show that e¡° is nowhere decreasing. By Step 1, the path of S
for (c1;c2) contains seg[(°(c1);c2¡c1+°(c1));(c1;c2)] (= seg[k2;cf1;2g] on the
¯gure) and its path for (c1;c3) contains seg[(°(c1);c3 ¡ c1 + °(c1));(c1;c3)]
26(= seg[`2;cf1;3g]). Thus, by Fact 1, its path for c contains seg[(°(c1);c2¡c1+
°(c1);c3 ¡c1 +°(c1));c] (= seg[m2;c]), and by Fact 1 again, projecting onto
Rf2;3g, its path for (c2;c3) contains seg[(c2¡c1+°(c1);c3¡c1+°(c1));(c2;c3)]
(= seg[n2;cf2;3g]). By Step 1, and since c2 < c3, the path of S for (c2;c3)
contains seg[(°(c2);c3¡c2+°(c2));(c2;c3)] and it has a kink at (°(c2);c3¡c2+
°(c2)). These two conclusions can hold together only if c2¡°(c2) ¸ c1¡°(c1).
Step 3: Concluding. Steps 1 and 2 together imply that there is ° 2 ¡ such
that on the domain of two-claimant problems in which the two claimants have
unequal claims, S = S°. Since the ICI rules satisfy equal treatment of equals,
this equality also holds, trivially, for two-claimant problems in which the two
claimants have equal claims. By hypothesis, S is consistent and because S°
is consistent and resource monotonic, it is conversely consistent (for a proof
of this implication, see Chun, 1999). Thus, by the Elevator Lemma, S = S°
for any number of claimants. ¤
Next, we search for the consistent CIC rules. The constrained equal
awards and constrained equal losses rules are among them, and so is the
reverse Talmud rule. We will show that the consistent CIC rules can also be
indexed by the elements of ¡. They are de¯ned as follows:
CIC* rule associated with ° 2 ¡, R°: For each N 2 N and each c 2 RN
+,





k=1 = (°(~ cn) ¡ °(~ cn¡1), °(~ cn) + °(~ cn¡1) ¡ 2°(~ cn¡2), ...,
°(~ cn)+°(~ cn¡1)+¢¢¢+°(~ c2)¡(n¡1)°(~ c1)), (Gk(c))
n¡1
k=1 being obtained from
(Fk(c))
n¡1
k=1 by means of the CIC relations.
If ° = 0, R° = CEA; if ° = e, R° = CEL; and if ° = e
2, R° = T r (the
reverse Talmud rule).
Lemma 7 The CIC* rules are parametric rules.
Proof: Let ° 2 ¡. We simply exhibit a representation f of R° (Figure 9a).
Let ¸ = ¡1 and ¹ ¸ = 1. Let B° ´ f(c0 ¡ °(c0);c0): c0 2 R+g. For each
c0 2 R+, let f(c0;¢): R ! R+ whose graph consists of the horizonal half-
line f(t;0): t 2] ¡ 1;¡°(c0)]g, the segment of slope 1 whose endpoints are
(¡°(c0);0) and (c0 ¡ °(c0);c0) (this second point belongs to B°), and the
horizontal half-line f(t;c0): t 2 [c0 ¡ °(c0);1[g. It is easy to see that the
27function f is well-de¯ned and satis¯es the properties listed in the de¯nition
of a parametric rule.
To see that indeed f is a parametric representation of R°, it is enough
to consider the two-claimant case, as the logic is the same for the general
case. Let N ´ f1;2g and suppose that agent 1's claim is c0 and agent 2's
claim c0
0 > c0. The functions f(c0;¢) and f(c0
0;¢) are plotted in Figure 9b. As
the endowment increases from 0 to the sum of the claims, the equilibrium ¸
increases from ¡1 to ¡°(c0
0), the graphs of both f(c0;¢) and f(c0
0;¢) follow
the horizontal axis, and neither claimant gets anything. (We have what we
called in the proof of Lemma 4 a \dead interval".) As ¸ increases from ¡°(c0
0)
to ¡°(c0), the graph of f(c0;¢) remains horizontal but the graph of f(c0
0;¢)
starts going up. Thus, claimant 2 receives each increment of the endowment.
As ¸ increases from ¡°(c0) to c0 ¡ °(c0), the graphs of both f(c0;¢) and
f(c0
0;¢) are parallel lines, so equal division of each increment prevails. At
¸ = c0 ¡ °(c0), claimant 1 is fully compensated. As ¸ increases from that
point, the graph of f(c0;¢) is horizontal, but that of f(c0
0;¢) is still going up,
so claimant 2 receives the totality of each increment. At ¸ = c0
0 ¡ °(c0
0),
claimant 2 is also fully compensated and his graph also becomes horizontal.
We have a dead interval of values of ¸ in which both awards remain stationary
and equal to claims. Altogether, we have obtained the path of R° for (c0;c0
0).
¤
If ° = 0, B° is the 45± line; then, R° = CEA. If ° = e, B° is the vertical
axis, then, R° = CEL. If ° = e
2, B° is the ray of slope 2; then, R° = T r.
For each µ 2 [0;1[, if ° = µe, B° is the ray of slope 1
1¡µ (for µ = 1, it is the
vertical axis), and R° = Uµ.
Theorem 2 A CIC rule is consistent if and only if it is a CIC* rule.
Proof: Each CIC* rule is by de¯nition a CIC rule. It is consistent because it
is a parametric rule (Lemma 7) and parametric rules satisfy this property.19
19The consistency of the CIC* rules can also be seen directly as follows. Let ° 2 ¡ and
consider R°. Let N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN. Suppose ¯rst that E ·
P
°(ci). Then, there
is k 2 f0;:::;jNjg such that each claimant i 2 N whose claim is among the k largest
claims in c receives °(ci) and all others receive 0. Let ~ N be the ¯rst of these two sets. Let
N0 ½ N. Let ~ N0 ´ N0 \ ~ N. The members of ~ N0 have the largest claims in N0. Let us
assign to each i 2 ~ N0 the amount °(ci) and to the others 0. Also, N0 n ~ N = N n ~ N. The
case when E ¸
P




























Figure 9: Parametric representation of CIC* rules. (a) Schedule f(c0;¢)
of a parametric representation of the CIC* rule associated with some ° 2 ¡, R°.
(b) Two schedules, for claims c0 and c0
0, used to determine the path for (c0;c0
0).
Conversely, let S be a consistent CIC rule.
Step 1: For each c0 > 0, there is a function °: ]c0;1[! R+ such
that the following holds. Let N 2 N with jNj = 2 and c 2 RN
++
of unequal coordinates, both of which larger than c0. Then, the
greater coordinate of the lowest endpoint of the segment of slope 1
contained in the path of S for c is °(maxfcig) ¡ °(minfcig). Also,
° is nowhere decreasing.
Let c0 > 0. Let N ´ f1;2;3g and c 2 RN
+ be such that c1 ´ c0, and
c0 < c2 < c3. Let ¦1, ¦2, and ¦3 be the paths of awards of S for (c2;c3),
(c1;c3), and (c1;c2).
By de¯nition of a CIC rule, since c1 < c2, ¦3 contains a segment seg[k1;k2]
with k1 2 Rf1;2g such that k1
1 = 0 and k2 ´ k1 + (c1;c1), and since c1 < c3,
¦3 contains a segment seg[`1;`2] with `1 2 Rf1;3g such that `1
1 = 0 and
`2 ´ `1+(c1;c1) (Figure 10a). By anonymity of S, which holds by Lemma 5,
the larger coordinate of k1 and the larger coordinate of `1 are independent
of the fact that ¦3 and ¦2 are paths of S for problems involving the groups




Next, we show that ° is nowhere decreasing. By Fact 1, ¦ contains
the segment whose projection onto Rf1;2g is seg[k1;k2] and whose projection




3)], (= seg[m1;m2] in Fig-





3)] (= seg[n1;n2] in the ¯gure). By Fact 1, this segment












































Figure 10: Proof of Theorem 2. (a) Step 1: deriving the existence of the
function °: ]c0;1[! R+. Also, showing that ° is nowhere decreasing. (b) Step 2:
showing that e ¡ ° is nowhere decreasing.
30this segment contains the point (°(c3) ¡ °(c2);0), which belongs to one of
the shorter sides of the rectangle with vertices (0;0) and (c2;c3) (Figure 10a).
Since c2 < c3, this contradicts what we know of the path of an CIC rule for
(c2;c3): the middle segment contained in such a path should meet both of
the longer sides of this rectangle. Thus, °(c2) ¸ °(c3). Since this holds for
each pair fc2;c3g such that c1 ´ c0 < c2 < c3, ° is nowhere decreasing on its
domain ]c0;1[.
Step 2: The function e ¡ ° is nowhere decreasing. Suppose by con-
tradiction that for some a;b 2 R+ with c0 < a < b, a ¡ °(a) > b ¡ °(b).
Let N ´ f1;2;3g, c1 ´ c0, c2 ´ a, and c3 ´ b (Figure 10b). The seg-
ment of slope 1 contained in the path of S for (c2;c3) contains the point
(c3;°(c2) + c3 ¡ °(c3)), which belongs to one of the shorter sides of the rect-
angle with vertices (0;0) and (c2;c3). Since c2 < c3, this contradicts what we
know of the path of S for (c2;c3).
Step 3: Extending the domain of de¯nition of ° to R+. The function
° obtained in Step 2 is de¯ned over ]c0;1[ for a particular c0 > 0. We now
extend its domain of de¯nition to the whole of R+. Let 0 < a · c0. We will
de¯ne °(a). Given 0 < ¹ c0 < a, we can construct a function ¹ °: ]¹ c0;1[! R+
as we constructed °. We will show that over the common part of their
domains of de¯nition, namely ]c0;1[, the functions ° and ¹ ° are equal up to
an additive constant. Indeed, let c2;c3 2]c0;1[ be such that c2 < c3. By the
de¯nition of °, the middle segment in the path of S for (c2;c3) intersects Rf3g
at (0;°(c3) ¡ °(c2)), and by the de¯nition of ¹ °, this segment intersects Rf3g
at (0; ¹ °(c3) ¡ ¹ °(c2)). Thus, °(c3) ¡ °(c2) = ¹ °(c3) ¡ ¹ °(c2). Keeping c2 ¯xed,
we conclude that over ]c2;1[, ° and ¹ ° are equal up to an additive constant.
Since c2 was chosen arbitrarily subject to c0 < c2, it follows that over ]c0;1[,
the two functions are equal up to an additive constant.
Now, let b > c0, and set °(a) ´ ¹ °(a) + °(b) ¡ ¹ °(b). This value of °(a)
is independent of the choice of ¹ c0. Thus, ° is well-de¯ned. Also, by its con-
struction, ° inherits the two monotonicity properties established in Steps 1
and 2. They imply that limt!0 °(t) exists. Let g designate this limit. To
obtain a function in ¡, it now su±ces to add ¡g to °.
Step 4: Concluding. Steps 1, 2, and 3 together imply that there is ° 2 ¡
such that on the domain of two-claimant problems with unequal claims,
S = R°. Since the CIC rules satisfy equal treatment of equals, this con-
clusion extends, trivially, to the case of two claimants with equal claims. By
hypothesis, S is consistent and since R° is consistent and resource mono-
31tonic, it is conversely consistent (implication already noted in the proof of
Theorem 1). Thus, by the Elevator Lemma, S = R° for any number of
claimants. ¤
Remark 1: Given a two-claimant rule S, an interesting question is whether
there is a rule R de¯ned for all populations that coincides with S in the two-
claimant case and is consistent. If such a rule exists, it is the consistent
extension of S. Instead of asking whether one can select, for each N 2
N, an ICI rule de¯ned on CN, so that the rule on
S
N2N CN so de¯ned is
consistent (the question answered by Theorem 1), one can ask whether a
given two-claimant ICI rule has a consistent extension R. This is a more
general question because now the components of R relative to groups with
more than two claimants are not required to be ¯xed-population ICI rules
themselves.
We have all the elements for the answer. Since the ICI rules satisfy equal
treatment of equals, if R exists, it does too in the two-claimant case. If a rule
satis¯es this property in the two-claimant case and is consistent, it satis¯es
the property in general. (This is an example of a Lifting Theorem, of the
kind established by Hokari and Thomson, 2000.) Thus, Lemma 5 applies.
The proof can then proceed as before. We derive the function ° as we did.
The result can now be stated as follows: if the two-claimant components of a
rule R on
S
N2N CN are two-claimant ICI rules and R is consistent, then there
is ° 2 ¡ such that the two-claimant components of R are the two-claimant
components of the ICI* rule associated with °; moreover, its components
relative to greater populations are also the components of an ICI* rule, and
they too are associated with °.
The same comment applies to the CIC rules.
Remark 2: Suppose that instead of specifying for each N 2 N, an arbitrary
ICI rule, one speci¯es a member of the Moreno-Ternero{Villar family (2006a)
associated with some parameter µN 2 [0;1]. One can then inquire about what
is needed for the resulting rule fT µNgN2N to be consistent. Under these more
restrictive assumptions, the proof of Theorem 1 simpli¯es. The answer is that
there is µ 2 [0;1] such that for each N 2 N, µN = µ. A similar comment
applies to the CIC rules.
Remark 3: The subfamily of homogeneous ICI* rules is fT µgµ2[0;1]. This is
the Moreno-Ternero{Villar family (2006a). Also, the subfamily of homoge-
neous CIC* rules is fUµgµ2[0;1].
32Remark 4: In a companion paper (Thomson, 2007c), we identify conditions
relating the functions (F;G) and (F 0;G0) with which two ICI rules are as-
sociated for them to be comparable in the Lorenz order. We derive parallel
conditions for two CIC rules.
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35Appendix
The remaining ¯gures give parametric representations of selected mem-
bers of the ICI* and CIC* families. To read Figures 11 and 12, follow the
instructions given in Lemma 4, and to read Figures 13 and 14, follow the







U °(c0) = c0
f(c0;¢)
¸ = 0 ¹ ¸ 6












¸ = 0 ¹ ¸ 6
¹ ¸ ¡ h(c0)
¸¤
(b)
Figure 11: Two special members of the ICI* family. (a) Constrained equal
awards rule (obtained for ° = 0). (b) Constrained equal losses rule (obtained for
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(b)
Figure 12: Two other special member of the ICI* family. (a) Talmud
rule (obtained for ° = c

















Figure 13: Two special members of the CIC* family. (a) Constrained equal





















Figure 14: Two other special members of the CIC* family. (a) The
reverse Talmud rule (obtained for ° = e
2). (b) Member of the subfamily fUµgµ2[0;1]
(obtained for ° = µe).
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